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Abstract 
Human intelligence is redefined in light of new evidence that, in addition to general intelligence, 
broad mental abilities exist such as quantitative, spatial, and verbal-comprehension intelligences. 
Many of these broad intelligences pertain to circumscribed topics; that is, to reasoning within a 
broad content-area. For example, quantitative intelligence is concerned with mathematical 
reasoning, and spatial intelligence with reasoning about objects and their shapes and movements. 
Some among the broad intelligences are focused on reasoning about people: People-focused 
intelligences include personal intelligence (an intelligence about personality), social intelligence, 
and emotional intelligence. I argue for an understanding of each broad intelligence as involving a 
group of abilities necessary to reason about a specific subject area. To help organize the broad 
intelligences, a rationale is provided for categorizing them according to whether they focus 
mostly on things or on people. 
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 Intelligences about Things and Intelligences about People 
 
 In 1994, Linda Gottfredson, a professor at the University of Delaware, authored an 
editorial directed toward the educated public entitled “Mainstream science in intelligence,” that 
was cosigned by 52 eminent intelligence researchers. Gottfredson sought to address what she and 
others regarded as mischaractizations of intelligence research that had appeared in media 
accounts. Her piece appeared in the Wall Street Journal, and was subsequently reprinted in the 
journal Intelligence (Gottfredson, 1997). What is of particular interest here are not any missteps 
of the media at that time but, given the consensual nature of the document, the opening definition 
of intelligence. Intelligence is, Gottfredson explained:   
“…a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves 
the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex 
ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience…[I]t reflects a…capability for 
comprehending our surroundings—‘catching on,’ ‘making sense’ of things, or 
‘figuring out’ what to do.” (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 13) 
This already very good definition can be further sharpened, I believe, by acknowledging 
that intelligence has evolved to help people adapt to and survive in their environments. 
This evolutionary perspective encourages our consideration of intelligence’s role in 
people’s understanding of their surrounding world. Shaped that way, I would describe 
intelligence as: 
“A person’s mental capacity to solve problems that concern the inner self and 
surrounding world. The capabilities include the ability to represent information 
relevant to specific topics and contexts accurately in memory and to manipulate 
that information systematically. The ability further involves identifying the 
similarities and differences among concepts and contexts, ‘getting the point’ and 
drawing upon appropriate generalizations so as to relate existing information to 
new problems; it involves ‘figuring things out,’ with the purpose of finding 
effective solutions. 
Gottfredson’s definition employs the opening phrase, “a very general mental capability…”, 
placing an emphasis on general intelligence. Although I agree people possess a general capacity 
to problem-solve, I also believe they specialize in particular areas of problem solving—
especially by adulthood (Ackerman, 2014). For that reason, I have added the idea that the 
information relates to “particular topics and contexts” relevant to the person—a modification 
designed to allow for more than one area of intelligence.  
Although a theoretical model of intelligence that emphasizes general problem solving fits 
contemporary data adequately, there is increasing consensus that taking account of a group of 
differentiated “broad intelligences,” such as verbal-comprehension intelligence, perceptual-
organizational reasoning, mental speededness, and other qualities can enhance our representation 
of human intellectual performance beyond global reasoning alone.  
 
A Note on General Intelligence and Broad Intelligences 
 
Charles Spearman (1904) had first observed that people’s abilities correlated positively 
with one another across a diverse group of intellectual problems: As a person’s ability on one 
task rose, so it did on other tasks. This positive manifold, as the positive correlations became 
known, was a ubiquitous finding. If all human intellectual abilities rose and fell together, 
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Spearman argued, perhaps they could be represented as just one overall general intelligence. 
Spearman’s observation that mental abilities all correlated positively was supported by 
subsequent research. The correlations among abilities, however, were not all at the same level. 
Without getting too far into the technical details, I’ll observe that there existed subsets of tasks 
that correlated more highly with one another than with other subsets of tasks. The positive 
manifold, in other words, was not equally present across all abilities, and the statistical grey areas 
provided potential evidence for subgroups of intelligences (multiple intelligences) as well as a 
general one. The next 70 or so years were marked by a lively debate over whether human 
intelligence was best regarded as one or multiple in nature (see, for example, Gardner, 1983; 
Gignac & Weiss, 2015; Jensen, 1998; Sternberg, 1985; Van et al., 2006; Visser, Ashton, & 
Vernon, 2006).  
In the 1970s, mathematical psychologists introduced a new tool called structural equation 
modeling (SEM) for modeling correlations in the field. SEM allowed for statistical tests of which 
theoretical representations of intelligence fit correlational data best (e.g., Joreskog, 1969; Kenny, 
1976; Thompson, 2004). John Carroll (1993) assembled hundreds of findings from intelligence 
tests over the 20th century and applied SEM to his combined data set. He concluded that 
intelligences could be organized into three-strata (levels): his three-stratum model (also referred 
to as the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model), describes a hierarchy of mental abilities in which general 
intelligence is positioned at the top, rather like the CEO at the top of a corporate organizational 
chart, beneath which are a series of ten to fifteen broad intelligences, analogous to the corporate 
chief officers responsible for the financial, information technology, human relations, and other 
functions of the organization. Examples of these broad intelligences include the perceptual-
organizational, spatial, and verbal intelligences (Flanagan, McGrew, & Ortiz, 2000; Schneider & 
Newman, 2015). Carroll placed still more specific abilities at the third, lowest level of the 
hierarchy—analogous to the distinct individuals who run smaller departments of the 
organization. For example, vocabulary knowledge is part of verbal-propositional intelligence 
(McGrew, 2009). 
Many of the broad intelligences relate to specific subject or topic areas: People use their 
perceptual-organizational intelligence to understand how to fit objects together, such as the parts 
of an engine. People use their spatial intelligence to recognize objects and understand how they 
would appear from different angles, and to throw balls, rocks, and spear-like projectiles along 
particular trajectories. People employ quantitative intelligence to solve mathematical problems. 
Other broad intelligences concern memory retrieval and working memory span and play more 
basic, foundational roles in thinking.  
Today there is considerable evidence that these broad, interrelated intelligences exist 
subsidiary to general reasoning ability (Flanagan, Alfonso, Ortiz, & Dynda, 2013; Schneider & 
Newman, 2015; Sternberg & Hedlund, 2002; Sternberg & Project, 2009; Visser et al., 2006). I 
would argue, however, that the Carroll model of 1993 and models since have examined a diverse 
but nonetheless incomplete set of intelligences.  
 
A Startling Omission 
The problem with the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model of 1993 (and other models of the time) 
was that, integrative as it was, it nonetheless omitted key areas of intelligence. The broad 
intelligences focused more-or-less exclusively on reasoning about things: puzzle pieces (the 
perceptual-organizational), objects in space (spatial), quantitative (numbers), even the “things” 
that are the words and sentences we use (verbal), although words and sentences also include 
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thinking about people. This reflected the more general thing-orientation of academic psychology 
at the time.  
A second example of this thing-oriented focus was the classical approach to primate 
cognition of the mid-20th century: Comparative psychologists, who were studying chimpanzees’ 
and bonobos’ intellect, chiefly focused on their “understanding of objects and their various 
spatial, causal, and featural interrelations” (Tomasello & Call, 1997, p. 25). Psychologists 
viewed chimpanzees and bonobos as mostly preoccupied with foraging for food: mapping the 
world around them, finding shortcuts to the food, and predicting where food would next appear 
(Tomasello & Call, 1997). These non-human primates could indeed categorize objects, 
understand the objects as permanent (in the Piagetian sense), rotate objects in their minds, and 
count small numbers of objects—mental abilities that paralleled such human intelligences as the 
perceptual-organizational, the spatial and the quantitative. 
Reasoning about Individuals? 
Over time, however, comparative psychologists realized that our nearest primate relatives 
not only reasoned about things but also about one another, although the researchers were 
“somewhat slow to recognize this fact” (Tomasello & Call, 1997, p. 187). Non-human primates, 
it turned out, also strove to assess other individuals’ intentions, to learn from them, and 
ultimately to predict other individuals’ behaviors as best they could. Tomasello and Call 
observed: 
 “Because primates individually recognize many of the members of their social 
groups, they come to know…the…behavioral tendencies of specific individuals, 
both toward themselves and toward one another making for a highly complex 
“social field” in which virtually every decision made must take account of…the 
social relationships of virtually all the individuals present.” (1997, p. 187) 
 
Intelligences about People 
 
Although academic psychologists mostly focused on reasoning about things, there were 
exceptions: Edward L. Thorndike (1920) had proposed a social intelligence: “an ability to 
understand and manage men and women, boys and girls, to act wisely in human relations.” A 
first ability-based measure of social intelligence was developed (Hunt, 1928), but sophisticated 
reviewers regarded its test scores as insufficiently distinct from general IQ to demonstrate the 
existence of a new mental ability (R. L. Thorndike & Stein, 1937). Twenty-three years later, Lee 
J. Cronbach concurred that “…social intelligence remain[ed] undefined and unmeasured” 
(Cronbach, 1960, p. 319). And still today, strong evidence for an independent social intelligence 
remains elusive (e.g., Conzelmann, Weis, & Süß, 2013). 
But alternative concepts fared better: In 1990, Peter Salovey and I introduced the idea of 
an “emotional intelligence”—an ability to reason about emotions (Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 
1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), which drew on precursor ideas including those of social 
intelligence and Gardner’s (1983) theory of multiple intelligences. In 2008, I introduced personal 
intelligence, described as the capacity to understand personality in oneself and others (Mayer, 
2008). Personal intelligence drew together areas of reasoning described in such precursor 
concepts as psychological mindedness (Appelbaum, 1973) and the good judge of people (Funder, 
2001), and involved an explicit rationale for the existence of a unitary reasoning process about 
personality (Mayer, 2009; Mayer, 2014).  
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At the time of Carroll’s three-stratum model, the idea of any intelligence focused on 
personality, or on people’s emotions, seemed a poor fit with the more thing-focused intelligences 
of the day. Initially, many psychologists rejected the possibility that an emotional intelligence 
might exist (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Locke, 2005). Although I will focus on 
emotional and personal intelligences here, there are other possible members of the group 
including practical intelligence (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985; Wagner, 2000), spiritual 
intelligence (Emmons, 2000), and the aforementioned social intelligence (Conzelmann et al., 
2013; Weis & Süß, 2007; Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995).  
 
Measuring People-Centered Intelligences 
 
The Test Development Process 
 The most direct evidence for intelligences about people come from empirical research 
based on the ability-based theories of emotional and personal intelligences: If a reliable measure 
of a well-defined psychological variable can be developed, and its validity demonstrated, the 
existence of the variable is supported (Cacioppo, Semin, & Berntson, 2004; Haig, 2005). In our 
laboratory, we have been involved in a program of test development and improvement around 
both the emotional and personal intelligences (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2016). For both 
intelligences, we have engaged in a multiple-step process of test development (see Figure 1), 
centered around the principle that these intelligences can be assessed as mental abilities (Mayer 
et al., 2016).  
 




In the first stage of test development, we define the intelligence in part by specifying its 
problem-solving domain (Figure 1, left-hand box). For example, personal intelligence is focused 
on reasoning about personality-related information; emotional intelligence is concerned with 
reasoning about emotions and emotion-related information (brief definitions are shown in Table 
1 (Row 1). Specifying the relevant areas of problem-solving content helps to define both areas of 
intelligence and to distinguish them from other similar areas of reasoning. The four areas of 
reasoning for personal intelligence shown in Table 1 involve identifying personality-relevant 
information, forming models of personality, guiding personal choices, and systematizing 
personal plans (Table 1, Row 2).  
  
Step 1. Specify the 
problem-solving 
area
Step 2. Specify the 
symbols, units, and 
operators of the 
intelligence
Step 3. Formulate 
the test and 
compose items










A Brief Overview of Emotional and Personal Intelligences and their Measurement 
 Emotional Intelligence Personal Intelligence 
Brief definition The ability to reason validly with 
emotions and with emotion-related 
information, and to use 
emotions to enhance thought.* 
The ability to reason about 
personality—both our own and the 
personalities of others—including 
about motives and emotions, 
thoughts and knowledge, plans and 




(a) Perceiving emotions, (b) using 
emotion to facilitate thought, (c) 
understanding emotions, (d) 
managing emotions 
(a) Identifying personality-relevant 
information, (b) forming models of 
personality, (c) guiding choices with 





Intelligence Test (Mayer, Salovey, 
& Caruso, 2002); see also MacCann 
and Roberts (2008) for an 
alternative 
Test of Personal Intelligence 1.2 
(Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2012) 
Sample test item If a person feels more and more 
frustrated over time, and thinks he 
has been treated unfairly, the person 





If a person is outgoing and talkative, 
most likely, she is also inclined to 
be: 
a. self-controlled 
b. willing to take more risks than 
average 
c. anxious and impulsive 
d. fairly thick-skinned 
*from Mayer, Caruso & Salovey, 2016, p. 7 
 
We next describe the informational building blocks, termed the conceptual units, people 
reason about in the area (Figure 2, second box), as well as the mental processes they apply to 
those units. For personal intelligence, one type of unit is the “mental trait,” including instances 
such as extraversion and verbal intelligence. Then we consider possible operators—clearly 
specified procedures of reasoning—used with those units (cf., Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, p 
152; Newell & Simon, 1972). For example, one key operator relevant to traits is the “go 
together” operator: If person X is dutiful, then person X is also likely to be self-disciplined and 
cautious according to several models that examine hierarchies of personality traits (DeYoung, 
Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; Goldberg, 1993).  
Dynamic pairs (DPs) are pairs of personality parts or aspects of personality that, relative 
to society, may cause the personality system conflict, owing to the inner or social conflicts they 
may elicit. A dynamic pair that leads to social conflict is the trait of disagreeableness in social 
relationships: A person with disagreeableness exerts considerable effort to disagree with others 
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rather than going along with a crowd. In addition, disagreeable people are often shunned, 
potentially reducing their well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
Dynamic pairs of traits or goals sometimes may cause inner conflict. A person who is 
both anxious and sensation-seeking will simultaneously crave risk and be fearful of the 
consequences their daring acts may entail. As a second example, a person whose goals include 
“being honest all the time” but who also hopes “to appear better in public than I really am” will 
face some difficult decisions regarding his or her aspirations (Emmons & King, 1988). Dynamic 
pairs also emerge from misrepresentations of the self, for example, if people’s erroneous beliefs 
as to who they are causes friction with how others see them. A narcissistic individual may 
believe he is cool whereas others perceive him as exploitative—and this ultimately can lead to 
negative social consequences for the individual such as impaired work performance (Oltmanns & 
Turkheimer, 2006).  
In the third step of our test development (Figure 2, Step 3) we formulate test questions 
that pertain to the subject area and concern the units and operators described above. Table 1 
(Row 3) provides references for the specific tests we and a few others have developed in the area 
along with some sample test items, for example, the Test of Personal Intelligence or TOPI. That 
measure includes items such as this: 
If a person is outgoing and talkative, most likely, she is also inclined to be: 
a. self-controlled 
b. more assertive than average 
c. anxious and impulsive 
d. altruistic   
The correct answer here is “b. more assertive than average,” because research on the big five 
personality traits indicate that talkativeness and sociability are more highly correlated with 
assertiveness than with the other listed alternatives.  
Although both personal and emotional intelligences concern people, they are 
substantially different in their subject areas. It is possible, for example, to write a hundred test 
items in the area of personal intelligence without much mention of emotions. Similarly, it is 
possible to write a hundred questions about emotions without asking anything much about 
personality traits or other information about personality. In Step 4, we administer test items to 
people to evaluate whether the intelligence exists, and simultaneously, the quality of our test 
items and test. Our theory of personal intelligence predicts that people who recognize 
personality-relevant units and their interactions will score higher on our test of personal 
intelligence than other people.  
Personal and Emotional Intelligences as a Broad Intelligences within the Three-Stratum 
Model 
Findings from personal and emotional intelligence tests indicate that each one samples a 
broad range of problems solving, and each individually assesses a reliable individual-difference 
variable (reliabilities typically in the r = .80 to .90 range for the overall tests), that is largely 
unitary. (How each intelligence might be best subdivided remains unsettled). MacCann and 
colleagues reported the results from a large-scale study funded by the United States Army 
Research Institute and Educational Testing Services. Their findings indicated that emotional 
intelligence, represented as three factors of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence 
Test (MSCEIT), fit well within the broad-intelligence stratum of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model 
(MacCann, Joseph, Newman, & Roberts, 2014). A reanalysis of the same data by Legree and 
colleagues reached the same conclusion regarding the MSCEIT’s fit within the three-stratum 
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model, but represented all portions of the test as a single factor (Legree et al., 2014). (For a more 
detailed discussion of its indeterminate factor structure, see Mayer et al., 2016).  
Personal intelligence, the newer construct, has not yet been tested in such a large-scale 
study, but it exhibits the same positive manifold with other broad intelligences suggestive of a 
broad intelligence. Personal intelligence may also divide into two subsidiary factors that 
correlate about r = .80 with one another (Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2014). The first factor 
involves perceiving consistencies in people’s behaviors. The second factor represents reasoning 
about personality dynamics, such has how goals interrelate, and how multiple observers each 
may perceive the same person differently. 
 
Thing-Centered versus People-Centered Intellectual Development 
 
People vary in their interest in things versus people beginning as early as the third grade. 
To ask yourself which you are most interested in, decide whether you most like to “…to stop to 
watch a machine working on the street?” or “to make the first attempt to meet a new neighbor?” 
(Graziano, Habashi, Evangelou, & Ngambeki, 2012, p. 468). Intellectual development may be 
guided by these interests. William Skimmyhorn and I were able to model course performance at 
the United States Military Academy at West Point largely by dividing course grades into a GPA 
for thing-related courses such as engineering, math and science, on the one hand, and people-
related courses such as literature, philosophy, and environmental and social sciences on the other 
(Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017). Occupations, too, are often distinguished by whether they are 
thing- or people-oriented: Compare accounting, clerical, engineering and research work, on the 
one hand, to sales, social services, and interior decorating on the other (Holland, 1966). Interest 
in the two general areas may in turn encourage a person to develop thing- or person-centered 
intelligences over adulthood (von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013). 
 
Specificity of Prediction? 
 
Correlates and Predictions 
A number of findings distinguish people- from thing-focused broad intelligences. First, 
within the generally positive correlations among broad intelligences, the more specifically thing-
oriented an intelligence is, the lower its correlation with people-centered intelligences. For 
example, personal intelligence correlates just r = .17 and r = .20 with SAT-Math and spatial 
intelligence measures, but rises to r = .39 with verbal intelligence (which presumably is mid-way 
between thing- and person-focused), and rises again to r = .53 with the the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes scale, a measure of understanding people, and exhibits an r = .69 with the MSCEIT 
understanding emotions and managing emotions areas (the latter, managing emotion area, 
arguably blends somewhat into personal intelligence at a conceptual level).  
Second, most intelligences correlate with the openness dimension of the Big Five at about 
the r = .20 level, but people-focused intelligences, compared to thing-focused intelligences, 
exhibit a unique pattern of correlations with the Big Five personality traits beyond that. 
Individuals who are better able to reason about themselves and others are also able to interact 
with others more smoothly and their self-understanding may lead to better control. Both personal 
and emotional intelligences, it turns out, also correlate with higher levels of agreeableness and 
conscientiousness (an index of self-control) than thing-focused intelligences (DeYoung, 2011; 
Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017; Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2012). 
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 Specificity of Course Performance. Mayer and Skimmyhorn (2017) presented evidence 
that personal intelligence predicted performance in person-centered courses—those in the 
humanities and social sciences—better than thing-focused courses. Eight pairs of correlations 
were computed over a main and a replication sample (Ns  = 893 to 1063) between an intelligence 
type (e.g., thing- or people-centered) that matched or mismatched grades in a course type (e.g., 
thing or people-focused). In each case, when the intelligence and course types matched, the 
correlation was higher than when they mismatched. For example, personal intelligence correlated 
more highly with courses in literature and philosophy than spatial intelligence did in both 
samples; spatial intelligence correlated more highly with thing-focused courses than personal 
intelligence did over both samples.  
 Specificty of Social Relationships. Both tests also appear to predict better interpersonal 
relationships with others. People better like and respect individuals who have higher personal 
and emotional intelligences than those with lower ability levels (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017; 
Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008). Emotional intelligence relates to fewer depressive symptoms 
and greater well-being (Fernádez-Berrocal & Extremera, 2016; Lopes, 2016; Mayer et al., 2008) 
and higher personal intelligence may protect against symptoms of personality disorders (Mayer 




The Definition of Intelligence Revisited 
 At the outset of this chapter, I compared two definitions of intelligence—one that 
emphasized general intelligence and the other that allowed for more consideration of broad, 
content-focused intelligences. The identification of a group of broad intelligences argues for the 
importance of content-specialization for at least some broad intelligences (others, such as mental 
speededness, may be more general). I further argued that one key means of organizaing such 
intelligences was into those focused on things, and those focused on people. 
Too Many Intelligences? Yes and No 
In a pair of influential commentaries, Hedlund and Sternberg (2000), and Austin and 
Saklofski (2005) raised concerns that there were, perhaps, too many proposed intelligences to 
accommodate in contemporary research: How, they wondered, would we manage an expansion 
of the already large number of broad intelligences. One possible solution raised here is to arrange 
broad intelligences according to key dimensions that distinguish them and help to define their 
interrelationships.  
Thing- and person-centered intelligences. Our focus here was on a person-thing 
continuum: Indeed, people-centered intelligences appear to have predictable and distinct 
predictions relative to thing-centered intelligences, such as the courses at which students may 
excel (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017). But there may be other dimensions as well. 
 Basic versus subject-oriented broad intelligences. A possible second dimension that 
could be added as an organizing continuum may be a basic, neurocognitive versus subject-
focused continua, in which the neurocognitive side is occupied by mental speededness, working-
memory and memory-retrieval, and the subject-focused end contains both the thing- and people-
oriented intelligences discussed here. It seems likely that the neurocognitive intelligences may be 
more g- and fluid-intelligence related, whereas the thing- and person-centered intelligences may 
reflect more crystallized intelligence. 
Implications of Person-Centered Intelligences for Education 
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Although intelligence levels are hard to change, education is highly effective at 
improving a person’s functioning given the intelligence level people do possess. For example, 
we are unlikely to improve people’s quantitative intelligence simply by teaching them algebra, 
but teaching high school students how to organize their thinking about algebra and about the 
already-worked-out ideas of the field is very effective at improving how well a student can solve 
problems in the area. Most people won’t come up with the binomial or quadratic equations on 
their own, but once taught them, can use the equations to solve algebraic problems. Similarly, by 
guiding people to build and organize their knowledge around personality, we may improve their 
effectiveness in thinking in the area. 
A number of after-school programs seek to promote skills about human relationships by 
teaching emotional knowledge, social understanding, and self-understanding more generally. 
Although the curricula of these programs vary widely, and not all might meet the standards of 
teaching their areas well, meta-analyses of social and emotional learning programs indicate that 
teaching people about interpersonal relationships allows students to function better 
interpersonally (and often academically) with substantial effect sizes in the range of .21 to .41 
(Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, & Schellinger, 2011). As we better specify the units and 
operators of people-centered intelligences, we may be able to teach people these areas of study 
more effectively. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 Between 1905 to 1990 just a few measures of people-centered intelligences existed, 
mostly of social intelligence, and research use of them had proven disappointing. As a 
consequence, the new models of human mental abilities that emerged in the 1990s mostly 
omitted their consideration. Now we have tests, data, and intriguing findings in the areas of both 
personal and emotional intelligences. None of the tests in these new areas are perfect, but 
collectively they indicate that intelligences about people exist and are consequential. The 
research on people-centered  intelligences has been eye-opening as to the importance of 
reasoning about oneself and others. To succeed in life doesn’t depend just on “who you know” or 
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